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Information-based Incentivisation when Rewards are
Inadequate
Samhar Mahmoud and Lina Barakat and Simon Miles and Adel Taweel and
Brendan Delaney and Michael Luck1
Abstract. In many cases, intermediaries play a major role in link-
ing between service providers and their target users. Yet, attracting
intermediaries at a marketplace to promote a service to their exist-
ing customers can be very challenging, since they are usually very
busy and would incur additional cost as a result of such promotion.
In response, this paper presents an information-based incentivisa-
tion framework, which combines ﬁnancial rewards with other mo-
tivating information, in order to incentivise intermediaries at a mar-
ketplace to undertake service promotion. Speciﬁcally, the interme-
diaries are associated with a group of incentivising agents, capable
of learning the individual motivational needs of these intermediaries,
and accordingly target them with the most effective incentives. The
incentivising agents collaborate with each other to gather motiva-
tional information, by sharing their observations on intermediaries.
The proposed incentivisation approach is evaluated through a corre-
sponding agent-based simulation, and the experimental results ob-
tained demonstrate its effectiveness.
1 INTRODUCTION
In order to be viable, service providers must face the well-known
problem of attracting sufﬁcient customers to purchase their products
or use their services. Competition can be very high, and choosing
where and how to advertise and sell a service can be crucial. In many
cases, this may best be achieved through various intermediaries (third
parties) in different marketplaces with a ready supply of potential tar-
get users. For example, in online advertising, providers could market
their products to a large user population via placing advertisements
on popular web sites (e.g. yahoo). However, intermediaries within
such marketplaces are often heavily engaged in promoting existing
services, and it can be very challenging to attract them to devote ad-
equate resource for promoting another service.
A promising way to tackle this challenge is via applying suitable
incentivisation mechanisms to encourage an intermediary to promote
a service. In fact, various economic and psychological studies em-
phasis the importance of incentives in directing an entity towards a
desired behaviour [1, 3]. Such studies reveal that there is typically a
mixture of motives driving an entity to undertake a particular task,
which could be intrinsic (e.g. out of personal interest in the task) or
extrinsic (e.g. to gain ﬁnancial reward or social approval), and may
differ among entities. Targeting such motives with relevant incen-
tives would thus allow pushing the entity’s behaviour in the desired
direction (e.g. towards service promotion).
The applicability of such incentivisation in computational systems
has been investigated by a number of researchers. In particular, most
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work here has focused on studying the effect of punishment (in the
form of ﬁnes) as a monetary incentivisation to establish a desired
behaviour among a population of self-interested agents in a multi-
agent system [6, 8, 11, 13]. However, monetary incentivisation alone
could be very costly, not sufﬁcient, or even not effective in certain
cases (e.g. when it negatively affects the intrinsic motivation of an
entity [3, 4]).
Few researchers have also considered other forms of incentivi-
sation to promote cooperation among agents, including violation
alerts [15], deferred reciprocity [12], and reputation [5]. Yet, again
these efforts are restricted to speciﬁc motivational factors, without
the ability to explore other, potentially relevant ones.
In response, this paper proposes a generic computational incen-
tivisation framework, capable of supporting monetary rewards with
any number of other relevant incentivisation mechanisms, offered to
an entity in the form of informational incentives. This framework al-
lows learning and reasoning about the effect of various incentives
on an entity’s behaviour (which is not known in advance and may
change over time), and reﬂecting such reasoning on the design of
more effective (personalised) future incentives for the entity.
The framework is presented in the context of the problem of mo-
tivating an intermediary to promote a service, and a number of spe-
ciﬁc motivational factors relevant in this regard are provided. Yet, it
should be noted that the framework is not restricted to these factors,
and can be easily extended to include others. Moreover, although
the framework makes no assumptions of any particular behavioural
model of the intermediary, an example of such a model is presented
and utilised for evaluation purposes.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces a moti-
vating scenario, followed by the proposed information-based incen-
tivisation framework in Section 3. A simulation model enabling the
framework evaluation and the corresponding experimental results are
presented in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively. Finally, Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 MOTIVATIONAL SCENARIO
Consider a scenario from the health domain, where medical re-
searchers aim to recruit sufﬁcient numbers of patients for clinical
trials. Such trials are the gold standard by which medical research is
evaluated. They are used to study various aspects of medical science,
as well as being a vital stage in the deployment of new drug treat-
ments. Currently, however, such trials are frequently unsuccessful at
recruiting sufﬁcient patients. Indeed, a review by the UK’s Medical
Research Council found that only 31% of trials actually recruited to
their planned target, with 30–40% of costs arising during the recruit-
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ment phase alone [10]. In this context, the main challenge for patient
recruitment lies in locating and contacting patients in a sufﬁciently
timely manner to allow them to participate in a trial. As a result, the
best way of doing so is via the clinic of their general practitioner
(GP), who has regular contact with patients seeking treatment. The
recruitment process thus often involves a human recruitment agent
visiting clinics in an attempt to locate suitable patients (e.g. asking
GPs or searching local medical records), yet this creates signiﬁcant
overhead as it is both slow and costly.
In response, several researchers [14, 9] have proposed replacing
human recruiters with software agents that reside at local clinics. In
this view, each agent would maintain a local repository of informa-
tion about active clinical trials. Whenever a patient enters a clinic for
a consultation, the agent would inspect this patient record in real-
time to ascertain if they are eligible for any trials, with instant noti-
ﬁcations being presented to a GP during consultation to inform them
of the patient’s eligibility. This would allow patients to immediately
be recruited, negating the need for laborious effort on the part of the
patient, clinical researcher or human recruiter.
However, both of the above solutions ignore the problem that some
GPs may not be sufﬁciently motivated to recruit patients. This may
be related to the limited time available to them, the lack of inter-
est in (or information about) the trial, or the fact the patients might
be resistant to signing up. Consequently, some means of overcoming
these factors, and ensuring that GPs are more willing to participate in
promoting clinical trials to patients, is needed. Note that, in the sce-
nario above, the medical researcher, the clinical trial, the GP, and the
patient, represent the service provider, the service, the intermediary,
and the target user, respectively.
3 INFORMATION BASED INCENTIVISATION
Clearly, both monetary reward (the commission received by the in-
termediary per each attracted target) and cost (the resources con-
sumed by the intermediary to attract a target) have a major impact
on the intermediary’s decision regarding service promotion. For ex-
ample, in the scenario of Section 2, such monetary reward and cost
correspond to the payment received by the GP per patient recruit-
ment, and the time spent by the GP talking to a patient about the
trial, respectively. Yet, other factors, such as service popularity, peer
pressure, and intermediary reputation, could also have an important
inﬂuence on the intermediary’s promoting behaviour, by modifying
expectations about potential monetary gains (rather than modifying
monetary gains themselves), or by triggering desires for altruistic be-
haviour towards particular direction, especially when compared to
such behaviour by others. Unlike monetary reward and cost, which
are usually easily accessible to the intermediary (from the agreement
with the provider and personal performance), information on such
other factors is much more challenging for the intermediary to ob-
tain (especially given its dynamic and distributed nature), and hence
could be overlooked or wrongly estimated. Consequently, a strate-
gic service provider should not rely on the intermediary’s ability to
acquire such motivational information, but rather seek to communi-
cate this information appropriately to the intermediary (in the form
of incentives), to ensure its consideration in the intermediary’s de-
cision making. Moreover, since different intermediaries may exhibit
different sensitivity towards various factors, targeting them with in-
formation should be tailored to meet their individual motivational
needs.
To achieve this, we propose associating each intermediary with
a personalised incentivising agent, capable of reasoning about the
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Figure 1: System Architecture
intermediary’s service promoting behaviour, learning the interme-
diary’s preferences, and correspondingly targeting the intermediary
with the most promising incentivisation information. The architec-
ture enabling such incentivisation capabilities for a single provider
is depicted in Figure 1, showing the interactions between the differ-
ent roles involved: the incentivising agent delegated by the provider,
the intermediary (which could be a human or another agent), and the
target user.
Since the main focus of this paper is the interaction between the in-
centivising agent and the intermediary to encourage the latter to pro-
mote the service, the target user role is ignored in the rest of the paper.
Also, we make the following two assumptions. First, each incentivis-
ing agent can interact with (and observe the promoting behaviour
of) the corresponding intermediary. Second, incentivising agents are
willing to share true observations of their interactions with interme-
diaries, and these are accessible to all such agents. This is reasonable
to assume since all incentivising agents represent the interest of the
same provider, and can be established by having all the agents report-
ing their results to a central agency (the service provider). Note that
this ability to beneﬁt from collected aggregated data on a service, al-
lows the incentivising agent to obtain more accurate service-related
information (e.g. service popularity), which is not accessible to the
intermediary.
Next, we elaborate in more detail on the potential informational
factors for intermediary incentivisation, followed by the proposed in-
centivisation model for each incentivising agent.
3.1 Informational factors
In addition to monetary reward (MonReward), and promoting cost
(Cost), other factors may also affect an intermediary’s behaviour to-
wards promoting a service, including: service popularity (SerPop),
peer pressure (PeerPress), and intermediary reputation (Rep).
Service popularity refers to the acceptance rate of the service
amongst target users, e.g. clinical trial popularity is the probability
that a patient would agree to be recruited in this trial if advertised. In-
tuitively, the higher the popularity of a service, the higher the chance
of receiving the monetary reward per each promoting attempt, and
consequently the more encouraged an intermediary would be to pro-
mote this service.
Peer pressure, in this context, refers to the promoting behaviour
of an intermediary’s relevant peers (e.g. direct competitors), which
may naturally affect this intermediary’s own behaviour (e.g. driven
by competition). For example, in the clinical trial recruitment sce-
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nario, it is very likely for a GP to be inﬂuenced by those GPs directly
known to them or sharing common interests. In the proposed system,
such peer relations among intermediaries are reﬂected via a topolog-
ical structure connecting their respective incentivising agents, where
each connection represents a relation between an intermediary and
one of its peers (e.g. direct competitors).
Finally, intermediary reputation refers to how active a particular
intermediary is in promoting a particular service. Clearly, the desire
to maintain a high reputation may positively inﬂuence the intermedi-
ary’s inclination to promote the service.
3.2 Incentivisation model
The incentivisation model of a particular incentivising agent (as-
signed to particular intermediary) with respect to a particular service
can be represented as a tuple, (F, vlc, utl, dcsn,msg, obs), detailed
below.
F is the set of candidate informational factors that could affect
the tendency of the intermediary to promote the service. That is,
F = {SerPop, PeerPress,Rep} (note, however, that the model can
be easily extended to include other factors).
vlc : F × T → R+ is a factor value function, which assigns to
each factor f ∈ F , its corresponding value at time step t ∈ T . Factor
values could differ over time and per intermediary, and are estimated
by the incentivising agent based on observing the intermediary’s pro-
moting behaviour and the information shared by other incentivising
agents of the same provider, as follows:
vlc(SerPop, t) =
population-level successful promotions at time t
population-level promotions at time t
vlc(PeerPress, t) =
peers promoted the service at time t
peers invited to promote the service at time t
vlc(Rep, t) =
intermediary-level promotions up to time t
intermediary-level promotion opportunities up to time t
utl : F × T → R+ is a factor utility function, which assigns to
each factor f ∈ F , its corresponding utility at time step t, with re-
spect to incentivising the intermediary towards promoting the service
(i.e. a higher utility indicates a more positive inﬂuence of the factor
on the intermediary’s promoting behaviour).
dcsn : T → 2F is a factor selection function, which deter-
mines the factors to be provided as incentives to the intermediary
at time step t, such that |dcsn(t)| ≤ limit. Here, limit is the
maximum number of incentives allowed at each time step. Such
a limit may exist due to many reasons, including communication
cost and intermediary constraints (e.g. a GP may simply refuse to
be overloaded with incentivisation information). Intuitively, the fac-
tor selection decision should be guided by the factor utilities, i.e.
dcsn(t) = fund({utl(f, t)}f∈F ).
msg : T → 2F×R+ is the incentivisation message function,
which returns the message to be sent to the intermediary at time step
t. That is, msg(t) = {(f, vlc(f, t) | f ∈ dcsn(t)}.
Finally, obs : T → {‘y’, ‘n’} is the intermediary behaviour obser-
vation function, which records the decision made by the intermediary
following receipt of message msg(t). Here, obs(t) = ‘y’ indicates
that the service was promoted, while obs(t) = ‘n’ indicates that the
service was not promoted, by the intermediary (note that t refers to
the time of sending the incentivisation message, regardless of the
time of decision observation, which may occur later).
The history of past interactions with the intermediary is utilised
by the incentivising agent to learn the former’s behavioural model,
and to update the utilities of the various informational factors,
so that more strategic incentivisation decisions, tailored towards
the speciﬁc needs of the intermediary, are made in the future.
In other words, utl(f, t) = funu(f,OBSt), where OBSt =
{(msg(i), obs(i))}t−1i=1 are the prior interactions with the interme-
diary up to time t.
Concrete examples of functions funu and fund are presented in
Section 4.
4 SIMULATION MODEL
To study the effectiveness of the proposed information-based incen-
tivisation, we conducted an agent-based simulation incorporating a
set of intermediary agents (referred to as AGENT int), connected
according to a particular interaction topology, and their correspond-
ing incentivising agents (referred to asAGENT inc). The simulation
proceeds on the basis of rounds (or time steps). In each time step,
four different phases can be distinguished: promoting; incentivising
agent reconsideration; incentivisation; and intermediary reconsider-
ation. These phases are presented in detail next.
4.1 Promoting phase
In the promoting phase, each intermediary agent, ag ∈ AGENT int,
is asked to promote the service. An intermediary’s decision regard-
ing whether to do so in the current round, i.e. the current time
step t ∈ T , is determined according to its promoting probability,
pprom(t), which represents the intermediary’s tendency to promote
the service (higher values correspond to higher likeliness to under-
take the promotion). Having agreed to promote the service, the inter-
mediary agent then receives a reward for doing so, and calculates the
time required to do so. The decision made by each intermediary is
then observed and recorded by its corresponding incentivising agent.
Note that, initially, the promoting probabilities for all intermediaries
are set to random values, which are updated as the simulation pro-
gresses (see Section 4.4).
4.2 Incentivising agent reconsideration phase
In the incentivising agent reconsideration phase, each incentivising
agent, ag ∈ AGENT inc, adjusts its respective model in order to
reﬂect the information obtained from the promoting phase. Specif-
ically, based on the observed effect of the previous incentivisation
message (i.e. the message sent to the intermediary in the previous
round) on the intermediary’s behaviour, the utility of each informa-
tional factor f ∈ F , is updated according to Equation 1 (which cor-
responds to function funu of Section 3.2), where δu represents the
learning step.
utl(f, t) =
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎩
utl(f, t− 1) + δu if (f ∈ dcsn(t− 1))∧
(obs(t− 1) = ‘y’)
max(utl(f, t− 1)− δu, 0) if (f ∈ dcsn(t− 1))∧
(obs(t− 1) = ‘n’)
utl(f, t− 1) if (f ∈ dcsn(t− 1))
(1)
Such utility modiﬁcation allows the incentivising agent to gradually
learn the sensitivity of the intermediary towards various informa-
tional factors, thus consequently making more effective incentivi-
sation decisions, tailored to the intermediary’s speciﬁc motivational
needs. Note that this learning is excluded from the ﬁrst round t0,
with all informational factors being initially assigned equal utilities:
∀f ∈ F, utl(f, t0) = u0 (where u0 is a randomly generated value).
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4.3 Incentivisation phase
In the incentivisation phase, each incentivising agent, ag ∈
AGENT inc, has the opportunity to motivate its corresponding in-
termediary to promote the service. For the sake of this simulation,
we assume that only one incentivising factor can be sent to the in-
termediary per round, i.e. limit = 1. The decision of which in-
formational factor to select as the incentive in the current round
t ∈ T , is based upon a probability distribution P over the factors,
P (f ∈ dcsn(t)) = psel(f, t), which is determined with respect
to their utilities (this distribution facilitates the simulation of func-
tion fund of Section 3.2). That is, factors f with higher utilities
utl(f, t) are assigned higher selection probabilities psel(f, t), such
that
∑
f∈F p
sel(f, t) = 1. A simple example of such a probabil-
ity function (the one adopted in this simulation) is: psel(fi, t) =
utl(fi, t)∑
f∈F utl(f, t)
.
Note that, the incentivising agent is allowed an exploration pe-
riod {t0, ..., texplr} at the beginning of the simulation, during which
all informational factors are always considered equally probable, re-
gardless of their utilities, i.e. ∀t ∈ {t0, ..., texplr}, P (f ∈ dcsn(t))
corresponds to a uniform probability distribution.
4.4 Intermediary reconsideration phase
In the intermediary reconsideration phase, each intermediary agent,
ag ∈ AGENT int, reconsiders its promoting probability. For this
purpose, we assume the following intermediary behavioural model
(note, however, that the proposed incentivisation model is indepen-
dent of any particular behavioural model of the intermediary). Based
on the outcome of the intermediary’s previous promoting decision (in
terms of the money gained and the cost incurred), and the incentivi-
sation message received from the incentivising agent in the current
round t, the intermediary re-assesses its current motivation degree re-
garding promoting the service, mtvdegree(t), and correspondingly
adjusts its promoting probability for the next round, pprom(t + 1),
reﬂecting the cumulative motivation so far, as shown in Equation 2.
pprom(t+ 1) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
min(pprom(t) + δp(t), 1) if mtvdegree(t) > 0
max(pprom(t)− δp(t), 0) if mtvdegree(t) < 0
pprom(t) if mtvdegree(t) = 0
(2)
where δp(t) is the learning rate in the current round t, which could
be either ﬁxed, or adapted (set proportional) to the current motivation
degree mtvdegree(t).
The motivation degree, mtvdegree(t), is estimated according to
the domination between the motivating and demotivating aspects, as
follows: mtvdegree(t) =
∑
f∈F∪{MonReward}
(w(f)× vlm(f, t))− vlm(Cost, t) (3)
where function w(f) ∈ [0, 1] returns the relative importance of fac-
tor f for the intermediary, such that
∑
f∈F∪{MonReward} w(f) =
1 (these weights are assigned to each intermediary on a random basis
at the beginning of the simulation); and function vlm(f, t) ∈ [0, 1]
returns the value currently held by the intermediary for factor f ,
scaled with respect to the factor’s minimum and maximum possible
values. Speciﬁcally, the values of MonReward and Cost correspond
to the outcome of the intermediary’s decision in the current round’s
promoting phase, while those of the informational factors f ∈ F
are either acquired from the current round’s incentivisation message
msg(t) (if f ∈ dcsn(t)), or set to 0 (if f ∈ dcsn(t)).
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Figure 2: Comparison between incentivisation strategies - population
level results
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In order to evaluate our approach, we ran several experiments com-
prising three sets. As a baseline, the ﬁrst set of experiments involves
no incentivisation, where incentivising agents provide no incentivisa-
tion messages, i.e. ∀t, dcsn(t) = ∅ for all agents. The second set of
experiments utilises a random incentivisation strategy, where incen-
tivising agents produce incentivisation messages on a random basis,
i.e. the exploration period texplr covers all the runs. Finally, the last
set of experiments utilises the learning-based incentivisation strat-
egy, where incentivising agents adopt the utilities learned according
to Equation 2 to select the most suitable incentivisation messages
(see Sections 4.2 and 4.3).
The results of each experiment set are averaged over 100 simu-
lation runs. Each run involves 1000 intermediaries and correspond-
ing incentivising agents, with a duration of 100,000 rounds, a sufﬁ-
ciently large number to avoid the development of misleading results
that could be affected by the length of runs [2, 7]. The exploration
period in the learning-based incentivisation strategy lasts until round
60, after which incentivising agents start using the learned outcome.
The MonReward is ﬁxed among all intermediaries, while the Cost is
generated randomly for each intermediary at each round.
For the interaction topology among intermediaries, we adopt an
example suited to the kinds of system we want to model. While lat-
tice topologies are regular structures, as opposed to random topolo-
gies, Watts and Strogatz [16] noted that many biological, techno-
logical and social networks lie somewhere between the two: neither
completely regular nor completely random. They instead proposed
small world networks, which we adopt in our experiments, as a vari-
ation of regular lattices in which agents are connected to a number of
hops (on the ring) away, but with some of the connections replaced
by connections to other randomly selected nodes in the network, in
line with some speciﬁc rewiring probability (set to 0.2 in our experi-
ments). This topology ﬁts well with our motivational scenario, where
we assume that a GP is more concerned with competition from other
GPs in close geographical proximity, and a few that are known to
them through other means.
5.1 Population-level results
Here, we study the changes in the promoting behaviour of interme-
diaries over time, from the overall population perspective. In this re-
gard, Figure 2 shows the evolution of the population promoting prob-
ability (averaged among all intermediaries), as a result of applying
the three different strategies outlined above.
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Figure 3: No incentivisation - agent level results
As can be concluded from the ﬁgure, runs without incentivisation
achieve a midrange average promoting probability pprom, which can
be explained by the uniform distribution of preferences towards var-
ious motivational factors (in terms of weights factorweight) be-
tween the intermediaries. In particular, a good proportion of these
agents have high MonReward weights, making the MonReward
alone sufﬁcient for them to overcome the demotivation incurred by
the Cost, and consequently increasing their promoting probabilities
pprom. Yet, a larger proportion are still signiﬁcantly affected by the
Cost (due to the absence of other informational incentives), and thus
decide to reduce their probabilities pprom, causing the average pro-
moting probability to drop to a low midrange level.
When utilising the random incentivisation strategy, the results in-
dicate that the average promoting probability pprom is pushed to a
relatively high level. This is because this strategy manages to sup-
port intermediaries with additional motivational factors, occasionally
succeeding to target them with the most relevant ones. Finally, as ex-
pected, learning-based incentivisation achieves the best performance
among all strategies, with an almost immediate effect on the inter-
mediary’s promoting behaviour (the average promoting probability
pprom starts to increase to a higher level after round 60). More detail
regarding the results is provided next.
5.2 Agent-level results
In order to provide further explanation and analysis of the results
above, we present here a more detailed view on these results with re-
gard to individual agents. Speciﬁcally, we study the behavioural evo-
lution of an individual intermediary agent, showing the changes in
the promoting probability pprom of this agent over time, along with
the motivating and demotivating aspects affecting such probability,
i.e.
∑
f∈F∪{MonReward}(w(f)× vlm(f, t)) and vlm(Cost, t), re-
spectively (see Equation 3).
In runs that have no incentivisation, MonReward and Cost are
the only contributing factors to pprom, since the intermediary here
has no access to other information, i.e. f ∈ F, vlm(f, t) = 0.
Figure 3 shows the balance between the effect of these two factors
(i.e. w(MonReward) × vlm(MonReward, t) against vlm(Cost, t)),
and pprom, for three types of intermediary agents: an agent with
balanced weights for all the positive factors (Figure 3(a)), i.e.
w(MonReward) ≈ 1
4
; an agent with high MonReward weight
(Figure 3(b)), i.e. w(MonReward) ≈ 1; and an agent with low
MonReward weight (Figure 3(c)), i.e. w(MonReward) ≈ 0. As
expected, intermediary agents that favour MonReward (those not
much inﬂuenced by other informational factors) increase their pro-
moting probabilities to a high level, since the monetary reward is
very likely to be sufﬁcient to compensate for the cost incurred. In
contrast, agents that do not favour money decrease their promoting
probabilities to a very low level, since the reward has little impact
on their decisions. Finally, agents with balanced weights maintain
midrange promoting probabilities since the MonReward occasion-
ally outweighs the Cost (when the cost is not very high).
In runs that utilise the random incentivisation strategy, in addi-
tion to MonReward and Cost, other informational factors are also
considered in the intermediary’s decision making. Figure 4 shows
the results in two cases: an intermediary with balanced weights for
all positive factors F ∪ {MonReward} (Figure 4(a)), and one with
unbalanced weights for these factors (Figure 4(b)). As can be seen
from the ﬁgure, in the balanced weights case, random incentivisation
works well in terms of motivating the intermediary towards promot-
ing the service more often. This is because, the intermediary here has
similar interest in all informational factors, and thus incentivisation
with any such factor guarantees a positive inﬂuence. The same does
not hold, however, for the non-balanced weights case, where the ran-
dom incentivisation strategy achieves much lower performance due
to the possibility of targeting intermediaries with irrelevant (uninﬂu-
encing) incentives.
This limitation is handled when using the learning-based incen-
tivisation strategy (Figure 5), which is capable of pushing intermedi-
aries of such type (i.e. with biased weights) to increase their pro-
moting probabilities to a high level, by providing them with the
most affecting incentivisation information. Note that, for reasons of
clarity, only 50 time steps (rounds) are shown in Figure 5, starting
from round 251, in order to show the effect after learning has taken
place. Also note that the learning-based incentivisation strategy sim-
ilarly achieves high performance for all the other weight settings
(i.e. high MonReward weight, low MonReward weight, and balanced
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Figure 4: Random incentivisation - agent level results
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Figure 5: Learning-based incentivisation - agent level results (the un-
balanced weights case)
weights), for the same reasons explained above for the other strate-
gies. However, due to space constraints, we omitted these results
here, and focused only on the case in which the other strategies fail
to perform well.
6 CONCLUSION
The paper presented an information-based incentivisation approach,
utilising various motivational information to support monetary re-
wards. In particular, to encourage an intermediary to promote a ser-
vice for a provider, the provider utilises a set of incentivising agents,
able to learn intermediary-speciﬁc preferences towards different in-
formational factors (e.g. service popularity, peer pressure and reputa-
tion), and target them respectively with the most promising ones. The
results of our experiments, conducted through an agent-based simu-
lation, illustrated that such additional informational incentivisation
can indeed be effective, especially in situations where monetary re-
wards are insufﬁcient or unimportant (where the intermediary values
other factors). Although the proposed approach addresses the ser-
vice promotion problem, we believe that it forms a basis for tackling
the more general problem of establishing a desired behaviour in a
community. Future work involves investigating negative incentivisa-
tion effect, integrating other interaction topologies, and applying the
proposed idea in a real-world application [9] (a software agent is cur-
rently deployed in over 60 clinics in the UK to help GPs recruiting
patients for clinical trials, and we plan to support this software with
the incentivisation capabilities outlined in this paper).
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